No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism

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No God, no God's Eye: A Quasi-Putnamian Argument for Monotheism (EN)

Gafvelin, Åke

info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

2021-09-19


Metaphysical realism is the thesis that “the world consists of some fixed totality of mind-independent objects” such that “there is exactly one true and complete description of 'the way the world is'”. In the first part of this essay, I will present Hilary Putnam’s worry with metaphysical realism. Secondly, I will argue that metaphysical realists must commit to metaphysical anthropocentrism in order to solve Putnam’s problem. Thirdly, I will argue that metaphysical anthropocentrism requires monotheism. Lastly, I argue that metaphysical realism is true. Therefore, we must be ontologically committed to God. (EN)


Quine (EN)
philosophy of religion (EN)
Putnam (EN)
Kripkenstein (EN)
philosophy of language (EN)
Plantinga (EN)

Conatus-Περιοδικό Φιλοσοφίας

English

The NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Laboratory (EN)


2459-3842
2653-9373
Conatus - Περιοδικό Φιλοσοφίας; Τόμ. 6 Αρ. 1 (2021): Conatus - Journal of Philosophy; 83-100 (EL)
Conatus - Journal of Philosophy; Vol. 6 No. 1 (2021): Conatus - Journal of Philosophy; 83-100 (EN)

https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0
Copyright (c) 2021 Åke Lars Gafvelin (EN)




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